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I. Introduction
“The atrocity crimes that stain humanity’s conscience make it 
imperative that leaders transform R2P (Responsibility to Protect) from 
a vital principle into visible practice.”1
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made this statement 
in an informal dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect—frequently 
abbreviated to R2P or RtoP—on the occasion of the principle’s tenth 
anniversary in September of 2015. According to its supporters, this 
concept has achieved major, tangible successes since it was adopted 
in paragraphs 138–140 of the World Summit Outcome Document in 
2005.2 However, the norm’s applications and its sheer existence have 
not been devoid of controversies. 
Gareth Evans, in The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass 
Atrocities Once and For All, stated that R2P must be invoked at the 
earliest possible point to protect vulnerable populations facing mass 
atrocities.3 Indigenous peoples the world over are marginalized and 
made vulnerable to targeted violence due to structural and systemic 
inequalities, outright discrimination, and the legacies of colonial 
oppression. Yet an R2P intervention has never been invoked in the 
instance of a mass atrocity committed against Indigenous peoples, 
despite evidence of targeted violence in many countries that would fall 
1. United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Remarks to General Assembly Informal 
Interactive Dialogue on ‘ A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ [As Delivered]” (New York: United Nations Headquarters, 
September 8, 2015), http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8950.
2. A/RES/60/1, para. 139–141.
3. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For 
All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 79. 
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under one or more of the four crimes that invoke R2P: crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing.4
Today in Bangladesh, for example, there is a clear case of systemic 
violence against Indigenous Peoples that is underreported and still 
actively occurring. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in south-
eastern Bangladesh, the Indigenous Peoples of the area have been 
socially, economically and politically marginalized for decades,5,6 
while violence has steadily been perpetrated against them with 
impunity.7,8 There was a Peace Accord signed to protect Indigenous 
lands and foster self-governing institutions in the CHT in 1997,9 but 
it has not been effectively implemented.10,11 Under the premise of land 
disputes, the Bangladesh government has ordered this entire area of 
the country militarized and there are substantiated reports of targeted 
rapes, looting, arson of religious sites and murders of Indigenous 
Peoples in this region.12,13 Why has R2P not yet even been mentioned 
within official United Nations documents on this conflict? Is it an 
appropriate mechanism for intervention in this instance? 
To test whether R2P could be applicable in situations of violence 
against Indigenous Peoples, this contribution will first outline the 
4. A/RES/60/1, para. 139. 
5. Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, “Bangladesh: A Critical Review of the Chittagong 
Hill Tract (CHT) Peace Accord,” Working Paper (Bangkok: United Nations 
Development Programme, Regional Centre Serving Asia and Pacific, 2005), 22.
6. “Bangladesh: Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts” (london, Amnesty 
International, July 31, 1991), 8–14.
7. Ishtiaq Jamil and Pranab Kumar Panday, “The Elusive Peace Accord in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Plight of the Indigenous People,” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46, no. 4 (November 1, 2008): 465.
8. Mark levene, “The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Case Study in the Political Economy 
of ‘Creeping’ Genocide,” Third World Quarterly 20, no. 2 (April 1999): 359.
9. “Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT),” Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, https://
peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chittagong-hill-tracts-peace-accord-cht.
10. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 2.
11. A/55/280/Add.2, para. 71.
12. Jamil and Panday, supra note 7. 
13. Bhumitra Chakma, “The Post-Colonial State and Minorities: Ethnocide in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 48, 
no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 281.
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history of the development of R2P and will discuss the literature 
around its normative elements. This chapter will use the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a 
normative framework through which I will assess the Indigenous 
right to self-determination as it pertains to mass atrocity prevention 
and intervention in Indigenous communities. Using the case study of 
the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, 
I will then analyze whether R2P could be an appropriate international 
humanitarian intervention mechanism in conflicts victimizing 
Indigenous Peoples. I will conclude with an assessment of how 
R2P could be better shaped to address situations of mass atrocities 
involving Indigenous Peoples, and how this paradigm shift may affect 
future iterations of the Responsibility to Protect as an evolving norm. 
It is important to note that the Indigenous leaders interviewed for 
this piece do not speak for all Indigenous Peoples who live in this 
area of Bangladesh and the reader must keep in mind that not all 
Indigenous voices can or should be essentialized through interviews 
with a handful of Indigenous representatives. Finally, an analysis of 
such a sensitive topic requires that the reader be aware that the author 
does not identify as an Indigenous person and therefore writes with 
the many privileges associated with speaking from outside of the 
persecuted group discussed in this paper. 
II. What is the Responsibility to Protect?
a. History and Content of the norm
In March 2000, then- Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report 
entitled “We The Peoples: The Role of the UN in the 21st Century.” In 
what has now come to be known simply as the “Millennium Report,” 
Annan grappled with many pressing issues facing the world at the 
time, including how to respond to mass atrocities without violating 
the sovereignty of states. In the report, Annan plaintively asks the 
following:
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to 
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gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity?”14
In 2001, the Canadian government gathered a panel of international 
experts to create the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) in response to Kofi Annan’s call for a 
new global solution to such gross violations of human rights. The 
Commission released a report later that same year that outlined a 
three-pillared approach entitled the Responsibility to Protect.15 This 
report envisioned a shift in the concept of sovereignty from complete 
and total control over the people living within a state’s territory to 
“sovereignty as responsibility,”16 meaning a dual responsibility to 
both recognize other states’ sovereignty and to “respect the dignity 
and basic rights”17 of all those living within the state. 
In 2003, Annan appointed a High level Panel of Experts on Threats, 
Challenges and Change to assess the United Nations’ ability to respond 
to the most imminent dangers to the international community. The 
report this Panel produced, in December 2004, endorsed the emerging 
norm of the Responsibility to Protect and even acknowledged the 
occasional necessary use of international military intervention to 
stop a government from committing mass atrocities against its own 
peoples.18 Finally, R2P was officially adopted by all Member States 
in three paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,19 
which was a major turning point in the international acceptance and 
formalization of the concept. 
14. Kofi Annan, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century” 
(New York, United States of America: United Nations Department of Public 
Information, March 2000), 48. 
15. “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty” (Ottawa, Canada: International Development 




18. A/59/565, para. 201.
19. A/RES/60/1, paras. 138–140.
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However, through the process of consultations with governments, 
civil society and academia, some of the core language of R2P was 
adjusted significantly from 2001 to 2005. The 2001 ICISS report 
deemed the threshold for international intervention to be the point at 
which the state involved was “unable or unwilling”20 to protect its 
own citizens; the 2005 iteration of R2P raised the bar for international 
intervention to the point at which a state was “manifestly failing to 
protect their populations,”21 despite there being no clear guideline as to 
what that would mean in practical terms. In a major adjustment from 
2001, the 2005 iteration of R2P clearly delineated four crimes that 
would invoke R2P: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and ethnic cleansing.22
Genocide has been an internationally recognized and defined crime 
since the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime 
of Genocide entered into force in 1951. This Convention establishes 
genocide as a set of five specific acts committed “with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”23 
Crimes against humanity were defined much later, in 1998, with the 
Rome Statute treaty that established the International Criminal Court. 
While the actions that constitute crimes against humanity are too 
numerous to list here, their defining feature is that they are “committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”24 These crimes 
include rape, torture and enforced disappearances.25 War crimes are 
also defined in the Rome Statute, which came into force in 2002. 
These include any violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
including Common Article 3 relating to persons not taking active part 
in hostilities, or “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
20. “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty,” supra note 15, at 29.
21. A/RES/60/1, para. 139.
22. A/RES/60/1, para. 138.
23. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide” 
(United Nations General Assembly, December 9, 1948), para. 2.
24. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (United Nations General 
Assembly, July 17, 1998), Article 7.
25. Ibid.
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applicable in international armed conflict, within the established 
framework of international law.”26 
Ethnic cleansing, however, is not defined in any of the aforementioned 
treaties. According to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
that was established by the United Nations to investigate violations 
of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, “‘ethnic 
cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using 
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the 
area.”27 This definition was further clarified in 1994 to mean “a 
purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove 
by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another 
ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas”;28 this is 
typically “carried out in the name of misguided nationalism”29 and 
its “purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion 
of the purged group or groups.”30 However, despite naming the four 
crimes that would invoke R2P, there is no clarification in the 2005 
World Outcome Document as to which of these actions, or at what 
threshold, would invoke which or any kind of international response—
political, economic, diplomatic, or military. 
Unfortunately, the version of R2P agreed upon at the 2005 World 
Summit denied practically any other way for states to intervene 
aside from Security Council approval unless the General Assembly 
converged under the “Uniting for Peace” process as per UN Resolution 
377; however, this process has never been used to invoke R2P.31 The 
Responsibility to Protect as it was adopted in 2005 sticks to a rigid 
reading of the UN Charter, stating that “collective action”32 against 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or ethnic cleansing 
26. Ibid., Article 8.
27. S/25274, para. 55.
28. S/1994/674, para. 130.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. “Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History” 
(Security Council Report, October 2013), http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_
Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf.
32. A/RES/60/1, para. 139.
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has to go “through the Security Council”33 for approval. The 2005 
iteration of the norm made R2P more difficult to invoke, as any of 
the Permanent Members of the Security Council could simply veto 
intervention and the action would be blocked from proceeding, no 
matter how many lives were being lost. Disagreement among the 
Security Council members has proven to be “particularly damaging in 
the early stages of a crisis when space for dialogue is wider.”34
Yet R2P continued to gain traction within the United Nations and in 
Member State capitals; it was first mentioned in the Security Council 
in April 2006, in a resolution regarding the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict.35 In January 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
released his report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” 
which was essential for the progression of R2P as it addressed the 
practical application of the norm in country-specific situations.36 
A wide-ranging debate on the subject—the longest General 
Assembly debate of the year, lasting three days—ensued in July 2009.37 
Since then, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has released a report every 
year on various components of R2P and has even appointed a Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, thereby strongly expressing 
his support for the norm and its proliferation within the UN system. 
Additionally, the Security Council has invoked the Responsibility to 
Protect in various resolutions as they have addressed crises ranging 
from South Sudan in 201138 to the Central African Republic in 2013.39 
In April 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2150, which 
reaffirmed the importance of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisers 
on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.40 
As of 2016, the protection of civilians’ component of R2P has been 
33. Ibid.
34. A/70/999-S/2016/620, "Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the 
Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General" (New York, United 
Nations General Assembly, July 22, 2016), para. 15.
35. S/RES/1674.
36. A/63/677, para. 51.
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incorporated in or guided ten Human Rights Council Resolutions and 
40 Security Council Resolutions.41 
The Responsibility to Protect has changed since its initial 
conception, but the principle has also made significant progress in 
terms of its acceptance. Despite the extent to which the principle has 
been internalized among some Member States and within parts of the 
UN system, however, R2P is still an emerging norm that continues to 
be contentious among states, civil society and academics. 
II.  What is the Responsibility to Protect?
b. Literature Review on the Normative Aspects of R2P
For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the literature analyzing 
the agency of subjects of R2P interventions and concerns around 
the principle’s roots in imperialist values. The subject of any R2P 
intervention is framed as a “population”42 as per Francis Deng’s initial 
conceptualization of “sovereignty as responsibility,”43 created during 
his tenure as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons. However, the term “populations” refers 
to, as Bridget Conley-Zilkic describes, “objects of concern that can be 
studied, abstracted, queried, and deemed someone’s responsibility, but 
they are not primarily subjects”44 and this term serves to lump together 
oftentimes disparate communities who happen to share a geographic 
locality. The logic behind who is chosen to be the subject of an R2P 
intervention is also unclear. Anne Orford asks who decides who will 
be the subject of intervention and, likewise, who decides what level 
of intervention is necessary in any given situation.45 Even though 
R2P condemns leaving power in the hands of those who commit 
41. A/70/999-S/2016/620, para. 7.
42. Francis Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press), 221, http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1996/sovrnty.
43. Ibid.
44. Bridget Conley-Zilkic, “Who Is the Subject of Atrocities Prevention?,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 6, no. 4 (November 27, 2014): 442.
45. Anne Orford, “From Promise to Practice? The legal Significance of the 
Responsibility to Protect Concept,” Global Responsibility to Protect 3, no. 4 
(December 1, 2011): 422. 
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abuses, the principle does not propose passing this same power to 
those who have been victimized. Rather, the power of determining 
the kind of protection necessary in any R2P conflict is passed to the 
broader “international community”46 which then decides the type of 
intervention necessary. This also removes agency from the subjects of 
these interventions.47
Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect principle continues to 
be plagued by accusations of thinly cloaked Western imperialism. 
48 linked innately to the suspicions of many former colonies that 
R2P will be used inappropriately in their states, some scholars have 
portrayed this principle as yet another projection of the interests of 
the world’s most powerful nations onto those with valuable resources 
and limited international influence. Particularly when the subject of 
the intervention is a state that was previously colonized, such as is the 
case for much of Africa and Asia, these countries are typically wary 
“of attempts to revise the rules of sovereignty”49 as some envision R2P 
to do. Many non-Western states were concerned that they had only 
recently achieved statehood and the rights that come with it50 and so the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility, not only as a right to govern 
one’s peoples the way one’s government chooses, was met with strong 
opposition by many formerly colonized nations amid concern R2P 
may be abused by Western powers.51 Even Edward luck, former UN 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect to Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged concerns about potential misuse of the 
46. Ibid., 423.
47. Conley-Zilkic, supra note 44, at 444. See also Anne Orford, International Authority, 
supra 45, at 139–188.
48. Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Colonialism and the Responsibility to Protect,” in 
Theorising the Responsibility to Protect, Ramesh Thakur and William Maley eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 307, http://ebooks.cambridge.
org/ref/id/CBO9781139644518.
49. luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 176.
50. Ibid., 180.
51. Ian Williams, “Dueling Principles: National Sovereignty Vs. Responsibility to 
Protect,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 32, no. 7 (September 
2013): 29.
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norm and issues of selectivity in his assessment of R2P’s first decade 
in 2011.52 
Siddarth Mallavarapu describes the entrenched nature of North-
South power imbalances that are now simply being resubmitted under 
the guise of the Responsibility to Protect.53 Mallavarapu invokes 
Makau Mutua’s “fiction of neutrality” in which the human rights 
regime itself is based on a paradigm of “savages-victims-saviors.”54 
Mutua describes human rights, as framed by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as falling within the spectrum of the “Eurocentric 
colonial project”55 and Mallavarapu, along with other scholars,56 fears 
that R2P is yet another iteration of humanitarian intervention in which 
one group is cast as saviors and the rest as outsiders or saved “others.”57 
It is at this nexus of debate around the agency of the subjects of 
R2P, concerns around sovereignty, and fears of Western imperialism 
that this paper situates the potential application of R2P in situations 
involving Indigenous peoples. There exists an extremely limited 
set of scholarly submissions on this topic. Federico lenzerini’s 
chapter “R2P and the ‘Protection’ of Indigenous Peoples” touches 
upon the paternalistic relationship between the “protector”58 and the 
“protected”59 wherein the former are inherently powerful and have 
the means and will to do the protecting and the latter are vulnerable 
and cannot save themselves. However, his chapter focuses mainly 
on the responsibility of each state—what lenzerini deems a “State 
52. Edward C. luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 3, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 396.
53. Mallavarapu, supra note 48, at 306.
54. Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 42, no. 1 (n.d.): 201.
55. Ibid., 204.
56. Frédéric Mégret, “Beyond the ‘Salvation’ Paradigm: Responsibility To Protect 
(Others) vs the Power of Protecting Oneself,” Security Dialogue 40, no. 6 
(December 1, 2009): 579. 
57. Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of 
Force in International Law (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 33. 
58. Federico lenzerini, “R2P and the ‘Protection’ of Indigenous Peoples,” in The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Peter Hilpold ed., (leiden: Brill, 2014), 329–347. 
59. Ibid.
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R2P”60—towards the Indigenous Peoples who reside within the state’s 
territory to acknowledge their rights as per the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) or the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 
lenzerini speaks to the importance of any form of so-called protection 
being implemented with the utmost cultural sensitivity, yet does not 
acknowledge the broader colonial, imperialist history that would 
complicate any attempt to apply the Responsibility to Protect by the 
international community to situations where Indigenous Peoples are 
involved.61 
There are, however, scholarly works on the Responsibility to Protect 
and minorities. The rights of minorities and the ways in which they are 
violated by the state are similar to those of Indigenous Peoples in that 
minorities are often vulnerable to multiple forms of exploitation62 and 
they are frequently marginalized and cannot easily seek retribution 
for the atrocities of which they are the victims.63 However, minorities 
research diverges from the literature on Indigenous Peoples in that the 
international minority rights regime is relatively under-developed in 
comparison to the international Indigenous rights regime and there 
have existed recognized differences between these two groupings 
since the adoption of International labor Organization Convention 
No. 107 in 195764,65 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Finally, the Responsibility to Protect 
has, in fact, been invoked in cases of violence among ethnic minorities, 
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Dan Kuwali and Gudmundur Alfredsson, “The Responsibility to Protect Minorities: 
The Question of Protection by Kin-States,” Europa Ethnica 71, no. 3/4 (2014): 68.
63. Nicholas Turner and Nanako Otsuki, “The Responsibility to Protect Minorities and 
the Problem of the Kin-State,” UNU-ISP Policy Briefs (United Nations University, 
February 27, 2010), 1, http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:2936.
64. Hurst Hannum, “New Developments in Indigenous Rights,” Virginia Journal of 
International Law 28, no. 3 (1988): 652.
65. Elsa Stamatopoulou, “Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights 
as a Developing Dynamic,” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 1 (February 1994): 
65.
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for example in Côte D’Ivoire, Kenya, and Guinea.66 Yet, R2P has 
never been invoked in a situation in which specifically an Indigenous 
peoples are the victims of one of the four R2P crimes by their state or 
by a third party. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is key to understand the importance 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) in boldly changing the paradigm around the Indigenous right 
to self-determination and the right to full and effective participation in 
matters that involve Indigenous Peoples.67 The UNDRIP represents, 
like all human rights instruments, a set of “minimum standards,”68 but 
one that has established an entire normative framework for accessing 
justice for Indigenous Peoples. These rights must be understood in the 
historical context in which they were created—namely, one in which 
Indigenous Peoples have been oppressed, marginalized and persecuted 
for centuries—and they must be read comprehensively, as they are 
“inter-related, inter-dependent, indivisible, and inter-connected.”69 
Additionally, the creation of UNDRIP represents a watershed moment 
in the development of the international human rights regime in that 
it enshrines the rights of Indigenous Peoples to both conserve their 
own practices of conflict resolution and societal organization but also 
to “participate equally in the global normative arena.”70 The hard-
fought establishment of this set of rights—and its recognition by most 
governments the world over—demonstrates that Indigenous Peoples 
are not simply the passive recipients of Western interventions but 
rather have the right to be active participants in the creation of their 
futures and the futures of their societies. 
66. “International Responsibility to Protect: Crises,” International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises.
67. A/RES/61/295, "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" 
(New York, United Nations, September 13, 2007).
68. Dalee Sambo Dorough, “Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination and 
Other Rights Related to Access to Justice: Normative Framework,” in Indigenous 
Peoples’ Access To Justice, Including Truth And Reconciliation Processes (New 
York: Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, 2014), 5.
69. Ibid.
70. Genevieve Souillac and Douglas P. Fry, “Indigenous lessons for Conflict 
Resolution,” in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution : Theory and Practice, 3rd 
ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2014), 608.
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In relation to R2P, liss argues that the right to self-determination, 
such as is outlined in UNDRIP Article 3, in fact provides a foundation in 
which R2P’s rhetoric might be grounded, while R2P provides a possible 
framework and a minimum standard of operationalization for the right 
to self determination.71 In this way, the right to self-determination and 
the Responsibility to Protect actually work to reinforce and ground 
one another. Additionally, Souillac and Fry outline how the concept 
of responsibility, such as that inherent to R2P, is aligned with conflict 
resolution methods intrinsic to many Indigenous peoples’ “existence 
and survival.”72 Unlike the United Nations’ previously typical response 
of reacting to crises that are already unfolding, R2P encourages 
prevention as one of its core building blocks. R2P acknowledges the 
interconnected nature of the world as it exists today; therefore, it could 
be argued that R2P might align with traditional Indigenous methods of 
conflict resolution that see the conflict resolution process as more than 
simply “a means to an end”73 but rather as part of a “consistent ethical 
approach to human and cultural survival.”74 In this realm of atrocity 
prevention and conflict resolution, Indigenous Peoples have much 
wisdom to impart on living cohesively not only with one’s immediate 
neighbors but also with the land, as there is no life without a healthy 
earth. By viewing R2P through the lens of UNDRIP, it becomes clear 
that a symbiotic relationship could exist between the two to strengthen 
one another’s impact and levels of acceptance and internalization at 
both the community and state levels.
III.  Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh
a.	 History	of	Conflict
The Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh is home to 11 or 
12 Indigenous Peoples, depending on the source one consults, which 
71. Ryan liss, “Responsibility Determined: Assessing the Relationship between the 
Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect and the Right of Self-Determination,” 
UCL Human Rights Review 4 (2011): 61.
72. Souillac and Fry, supra note 70, at 614.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
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amounts to roughly 500,000 people.75 Before it came under colonial 
British rule, this area was self-governed and its peoples—who were 
almost exclusively Indigenous—were relatively independent.76 
Even under the reign of British India, the CHT had the status of an 
autonomously administered district that was protected by the CHT 
Regulation of 1900, which banned the sale or transfer of any part 
of these lands to non-Indigenous people and limited immigration of 
non-Indigenous peoples into the area.77 However, this special status 
was eliminated via a constitutional amendment in 1963 while the 
area was still under the control of the Pakistani government, and 
the restoration of regional autonomy was rejected again during the 
creation of Bangladesh’s first constitution in 1972.78 So began the long 
process of creating “a homogenous Bengali nationalism”79 codified in 
the constitution, with “no recognition of a separate status or identity 
for the Indigenous People.”80 
Within a year, the CHT Indigenous political party Parbatya Chattagram 
Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) formed an armed wing called the Shanti 
Bahini.81 The Shanti Bahini started a “low-intensity guerilla war”82 
with the government of Bangladesh, although the fighting intensified 
following the assassination of the founding prime minister during a coup 
in 1975 when the military took control of the country.83 The military 
regime decided to deploy nearly a third of the Bangladesh Armed Forces 
in the CHT to control the surge of civil disobedience and outbreaks 
of violence;84 the army then started to bring into the CHT 400,000 
75. E/C.19/2011/6, "Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Accord of 1997/ Submitted by the Special Rapporteur,” para. 1.
76. Amena Mohsin, The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road 
to Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, (lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), 16–17.
77. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 5.
78. “Pushed to the Edge: Indigenous Rights Denied in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill 
Tracts,” (london, United Kingdom: Amnesty International, 2013), 15.
79. Jamil and Panday, supra note 7, at 468.
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83. Aminuzzaman, “Bangladesh,” supra 5, 7.
84. Jamil and Panday, supra note 7, at 469.
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Bengali settlers over only five years (between 1979–1984) through its 
“transmigration programme.”85 This influx of Bengalis occurred without 
any warning, discussion, or consent of the inhabitants of the region,86 
which violates the Bangladesh-ratified ILO Convention 107 in that the 
Indigenous Peoples of this area have the rights to their traditional lands 
and to effective participation in decision-making over what happens 
on those lands.87 It also violates the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in that Indigenous Peoples have the rights 
to “traditional lands, redress, effective participation and free, prior and 
informed consent”88 regarding what happens on their traditional territory. 
In fact, the Bangladeshi government at the time denied there was any 
intentional program of Bengali settlement in the CHT when questioned 
by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, although the 
government later admitted the process had been entirely deliberate.89 
This intentional migration process changed the demographics of 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts in a drastic way, with the percentage of 
Bengalis rising from 9% in 1951 to 26% in 1974 to 41% in 1981.90 
The Indigenous Peoples were largely relocated to “model villages”91 
while Bengalis were settled in the original homes of those who had fled 
the increasing violence or those who were forcibly displaced, or beside 
military encampments in so-called “cluster villages.”92 This same five-
year period of time also saw the establishment of approximately 500 
military camps in the region.93
85. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 6.
86. “Pushed to the Edge: Indigenous Rights Denied in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill 
Tracts,” supra note 78, at 27.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. “‘life Is Not Ours’: land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,” 
(Amsterdam and Copenhagen: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, May 1991), 
15.
90. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 7.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. “Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: The Slow Demise of 
the Region’s Indigenous People,” (Bangladesh: International Work Group on 
Indigenous Affairs, Organising Committee CHT Campaign, Shimin Gaikou 
Centre, 2012), 10, http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_
Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf.
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Finally, in October 1996, then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina set 
up the National Committee on CHT.94 After over a year of meetings 
between the National Committee and the PCJSS, the two groups 
agreed to a peace treaty that was signed on December 2, 1997.95 
The signing of the Accord created hope on both sides of the conflict, 
although it is worth noting that the provisions of the Accord were not 
mandated by any particular time frame and there was “no independent 
body overseeing its implementation.”96 Additionally, the Accord was 
not and is still today not protected by the Bangladesh Constitution; this 
means that any incoming government that does not agree to devolve 
power over the CHT to the tribal authorities could potentially enact 
legislature to eliminate the accord or reduce its power.97 
However, almost all external sources point to the fact that the 
Accord has not been meaningfully implemented in the 19 years since 
its establishment. In 2000, the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance said that the failure up until that point to implement the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord “threatened the survival of 
the cultural and religious identity of Indigenous populations”98 in 
this region. In 2001, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) expressed its concern over the “slow progress 
in implementing”99 the accord and urged the Bangladesh government 
to “intensify its efforts in this regard.”100 The Compilation of UN 
Information Report and the Stakeholder Submissions Report submitted 
to the Working Group for the 2009 Universal Periodic Review cycle 
contained criticisms of the government for its continued marginalization 
and targeted violence of Indigenous Peoples in this region,101,102 
despite the fact that by 2009, Bangladesh had already formally agreed 
94. Jamil and Panday, supra note 7, at 471.
95. Aminuzzaman, supra note 5, at 14.
96. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 19.
97. Ibid.
98. A/55/280/Add.2, para. 73.
99. CERD/C/304/Add.118, para. 10.
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101. A/HRC/WG.6/4/BGD/2, para. 39.
102. A/HRC/WG.6/4/BGD/3, paras. 46, 47, 49.
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to many core human rights treaties.103 While Bangladesh ratified the 
International labour Organization’s Convention No. 107 entitled 
“Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention” in 1972, they had 
not and still have not signed or ratified the updated Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, IlO Convention No. 169.104 Similarly, 
Bangladesh abstained from the vote on the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. 
In his 2011 report “Study on the Status of Implementation of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997,” UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues Special Rapporteur lars-Anders Baer found that 
“thirteen years after the signing of the Accord, it is clear that many 
critical clauses remain unimplemented or only partially addressed”105 
such as those relating to providing power to local tribal administration 
and restoring original lands to the Indigenous Peoples whose homes 
had been illegally occupied by Bengali settlers.106 The Special 
Rapporteur additionally noted an incident in which the Ministry issued 
a letter to various government officials in the CHT advising them to 
use the word “upajati” to address the Indigenous or tribal Peoples of 
the region rather than “adivasi.”107 Despite the fact that the use of the 
term “upajati” is mandated as per the 1997 peace agreement,108 this still 
caused an uproar because “adivasi” is the Bengali equivalent of the 
term “Indigenous Peoples” while “upajati” translates to “sub-nation 
103. Bangladesh acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1979; acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1984; ratified the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child in 1990; acceded to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1998; acceded to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights in 1998; and 
acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2000.
104. “Ratifications of IlO Conventions: Ratifications for Bangladesh,” 
International Labour Organization, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p 
=NORMlEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103500.
105. E/C.19/2011/6, para. 45.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid., para. 44.
108. “Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT),” sec. B(1), https://peaceaccords.
nd.edu/accord/chittagong-hill-tracts-peace-accord-cht.
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or sub-ethnic group.”109,110 The Indigenous Peoples of the CHT are 
referred to by other names as well, such as “small peoples/nations” or 
“khudro jatishotta” and “ethnic sects and communities” or “nrigoshthi 
o shomprodai.”111 This blatant disregard for the desire of Indigenous 
Peoples in the CHT to be called their proper names essentially denies 
these peoples their Indigenous identities at the state level. 
It is, in fact, this issue of terminology surrounding the CHT’s tribal 
peoples that Iqbal Ahmed, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission 
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, first commented upon in his 
statement following the release of Baer’s report at the tenth session 
of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in May 2011. The 
information in this paragraph comes directly from his statement. Ahmed 
stated explicitly that “Bangladesh does not have any ‘Indigenous’ 
population” at all. He went on to say that the “ethnic minorities” 
living in the CHT experienced “sporadic unrest in that region from… 
1975–1996” but that his government, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina—the same Prime Minister who helped create 
and signed the 1997 Peace Accord—has “resumed the process of 
full implementation” of the Accord. The government representative 
stated that “the Accord has nothing to do with ‘Indigenous issues’” 
and therefore the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is not the 
appropriate place to deal with the Accord. Additionally, he called the 
Rapporteur’s report “lopsided” and reiterated his government’s stance 
that they do not recognize “the authority of the Forum to discuss the 
issue of CHT Affairs.”112 
This consistent denial of the Indigenous identity of those being 
oppressed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts contributes in a fundamental 
way to the conflict in this region and that has made the Accord even 
109. “Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: The Slow Demise of the 
Region’s Indigenous People,” supra note 93, at 41.
110. Sanjeeb Drong, In-person Interview, May 13, 2016.
111. “Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: The Slow Demise of the 
Region’s Indigenous People,” supra 93, at 41.
112. “Statement by Bangladesh Delegation,” in UNPFII’s Study on the Status of 
Implementation of the CHT Accord of 1997 and Statements Delivered at the 
UNPFII’s 10th Session on the Said Study, ed. Mangal Kumar Chakma, (Dhaka, 
Bangladesh: Kapaeeng Foundation, 2011).
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more difficult to implement. The 2013 Universal Periodic Review of 
Bangladesh captured many of the same issues that were present in the 
2009 UPR. The Compilation of UN Information report cited UNICEF’s 
assertion that Indigenous children living in the CHT still “often 
lack access to basic and specialized services”113 and “recommended 
that Bangladesh adopt specific measures to combat discrimination 
and inequity”114 against these children. Additionally, human rights 
violations by both state and non-state actors have continued unabated 
including “rape and sexual assault against women and children, killings, 
arson, grabbing of lands, unlawful arrest and torture, and structural 
forms of discrimination based upon ethnicity, religious affiliation and 
gender.”115 large-scale attacks against Indigenous villages in the CHT 
were “often fuelled by extremist propaganda and hate speeches”116 and 
politicians and police were frequently implicated in their incitement.117 
When the author interviewed the Managing Director of the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts Foundation, Krishna Chakma, he called the CHT an “open 
prison”118 in which the military controls the lives of the Indigenous 
Peoples who live there, including by limiting press freedom, freedom 
of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of movement and freedom 
of free association.119 
One may wonder why the government would take such extreme 
measures to remove or irrevocably damage the Indigenous communities 
of the CHT. These are targeted and systematic acts of violence, and 
the motivation for performing them is often cited as being part of the 
Bangladeshi exercise of national identity building.120 Simply put, the 
Bangladeshi government is still attempting to distinguish itself from 
the nations that once ruled this territory by establishing the Bengali 
113. “A/HRC/WG.6/16/BGD/2,” para. 70.
114. Ibid.
115. “A/HRC/WG.6/16/BGD/3,” para. 64.
116. Ibid., para. 65.
117. Ibid.
118. Krishna Chakma, In-person Interview, June 6, 2016.
119. Ibid.
120. Chakma, supra note 13, at 282.
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identity: one ethnic group, homogenously Muslim.121 Article 9 of the 
original 1972 Bangladesh Constitution focuses on this unique Bengali 
identity: “The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving 
its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and 
independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in 
the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism.”122 
The identity of the Indigenous Peoples of Bangladesh, including 
those living outside of the CHT, was further minoritized with the 
Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment in 2011. This amendment 
reinserted the phrase “trust and faith in almighty Allah” to replace 
the word “secularism,” a change that was originally made in the Fifth 
Constitutional Amendment in 1979 by military ruler General Ziaur 
Rahman.123 This alludes to the movement towards institutionalizing 
Islam as the state religion, as was done with the Eighth Constitutional 
Amendment under the military ruler General Hossain Mohammad 
Ershad in 1988, and which was retained during the Fifteenth 
Constitutional Amendment.124 Article 6(2) of the Fifteenth Amendment 
creates a one-ethnicity state with the following words: “The people of 
Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation and the citizens 
of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis.”125 This Amendment 
denies the rights of Indigenous Peoples to identify as such, rather than 
as Bengalis, under the state. When Indigenous Peoples are identified 
in this Amendment, they are identified rather as tribes (“upajati”), 
minor races (“khudro jatishaotta”), or as ethnic sects and communities 
(“nrigoshthi o shomprodai)”.126 This furthers jeopardizes Indigenous 
121. Ibid., 289.
122. Ibid., 287.
123. Sultana Kamal, Eric Avebury, and Elsa Stamatopoulou, “Concern Regarding the 15th 
Amendment of the Constitution,” letter from the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission 
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Peoples’ legal status as citizens with equal rights under the Bangladeshi 
state. As Kuwoli and Alfredsson argue in “The Responsibility to 
Protect Minorities,” if the national rhetoric is constantly “dominated 
by vague, emotive questions of ‘national identity’, minority issues will 
be vulnerable to exploitation”127 and, in this case, the minorities in 
question will be subjected to discrimination and violence. 
Ultimately, the legalization of discrimination against Indigenous 
Peoples leaves no space for the Indigenous identities, cultures and 
languages of the CHT peoples to thrive in this country. Indigenous 
Peoples ascribing to Buddhism, Christianity or traditional religious 
beliefs simply do not fit into the mold of the Bengali national identity,128 
and therefore have to be removed from Bangladeshi territory or must 
be made to be so inconsequential as a percentage of the population that 
their traditions, cultures and belief systems will eventually disappear. 
The evidence provided above additionally indicates the Bangladeshi 
government’s intent behind their actions. 
Unfortunately, while the 1997 Peace Accord could have been the 
turning point in Bangladesh, this conflict seems further entrenched 
now more than ever before. The ongoing militarization and 
discrimination against the CHT’s Indigenous peoples simply has not 
gained international notoriety the same way other conflicts have. This 
lack of international attention allows the Bangladeshi government to 
insist they are implementing the Accord as they simultaneously work 
to undermine it. 
III.  Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh
b. Opportunities for International Intervention under R2P
As outlined earlier, the Responsibility to Protect can only be 
invoked in situations in which one of four mass atrocity crimes is 
being committed. This author argues that the evidence provided above 
indicates that ethnic cleansing is occurring in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts and has been ongoing for decades. In Scott Strauss’s chapter in 
127. Kuwali and Alfredsson, supra note 62, at 68.
128. “Pushed to the Edge: Indigenous Rights Denied in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill 
Tracts,” supra 78, at 15.
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Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, Strauss refers to the lack of a formal 
definition in international humanitarian law of ethnic cleansing but 
reiterates that this term is widely understood to mean group-selective 
“forced migration and mass population displacement.”129 While both 
ethnic cleansing and genocide require intent to target a specific group 
of civilians, the main difference between the two atrocity crimes is 
that the former refers to the removal of an ethnic group of civilians 
from a territory and the latter refers to an ethnic group’s destruction.130 
In 2008, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples sent 
a communication to the Bangladesh government to express concern 
that the land-grabbing in Indigenous communities in the CHT was 
part of a “systematic campaign to support the settlement of non-
Indigenous families in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with the active 
support of the security forces, with the ultimate aim of displacing the 
Indigenous community.”131 The transmigration programme described 
earlier in this paper was the beginning of this systematic attempt by 
the Bangladeshi government to change the demographic composition 
of the CHT, which has continued with the unimpeded land grabbing 
and terrorization of the Indigenous peoples. Chakma Indigenous 
Circle Chief Devashish Roy and Secretary-General of the Bangladesh 
Indigenous Peoples’ Forum Sanjeeb Drong, in interviews with this 
author, independently called the programme an attempt to minoritize 
Indigenous peoples in the region.132,133 The displacement of Indigenous 
peoples was aided by increasing violence experienced at the hands of 
settlers and government authorities such as the military, which forced 
many Indigenous peoples to move across the border into Tripura, 
India, or to seek asylum abroad.
129. Scott Strauss, “What Is Being Prevented? Genocide, Mass Atrocity, and Conceptual 
Ambiguity in the Anti-Atrocity Movement,” in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, 
ed. Tibi Galis, Alex Zucker, and Sheri P. Rosenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 24–25.
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Other authors argue that the violence experienced by the Indigenous 
peoples of the CHT rather constitutes a “creeping genocide”134 or a 
“slow-motion process of ethnocide.”135 Scholar Mark levene cites 
Raphaël lemkin in his analysis of the situation in the CHT: while 
lemkin, deemed by many to be the originator of the term “genocide,” 
intended the word to indicate a “a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves,” 
he still acknowledged that these actions did not have to include the 
group’s “immediate destruction” as long as they were part of an overall 
plan to produce the breakdown of the group’s “political and social 
institutions.”136 This could include the “destruction of the personal 
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals 
belonging to such groups.”137 levene argues that genocide represents 
“the extreme end of a continuum of repressive state strategies which 
might include marginalization, forced assimilation … and even 
massacre.”138 As early as 1991 the International CHT Commission, 
an independent group of international activists and scholars who 
promote respect for human rights in the CHT and also promote the 
implementation of the CHT Peace Accord, stated that “a genocidal 
process … threatens the hill people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.”139 
Their report found that this genocidal process is ultimately the result 
of actions taken by the Bangladeshi military, who are agents of the 
state.140 The violence currently happening in the CHT then certainly 
accounts for one, if not two or three, crimes that would appropriately 
invoke the Responsibility to Protect. 
134. levene, supra note 8, at 339.
135. Chakma, supra note 13, at 281.
136. Raphaël lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe : Laws of Occupation, Analysis of 
Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Division of International law, 1944), 79.
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139. “‘life Is Not Ours’: land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,” supra 
note 89, at 47.
140. Ibid.
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The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord still represents hope 
for many on both sides of the conflict, as it has been the only tangible 
agreement between the PCJSS, representing many of the Indigenous 
peoples of the CHT, and the government. Additionally, Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina, who signed the agreement, is once again leading the 
country; this further encourages both locals and international observers 
that the government may hold up its end of this arrangement. 
The R2P toolkit encompasses many potential avenues for conflict 
resolution but its first pillar, atrocity prevention typically through early 
warning mechanisms aimed at deterring violent conflict, is far beyond 
being useful in this situation. These crimes have been proven to be 
occurring against Indigenous peoples in the CHT, with the complicity 
and often active participation of state agents, and with the intent, as 
evidenced by long-term impunity, legislative and policy measures, 
to cleanse the area of Indigenous peoples or at least make them so 
marginal a presence as to render their groups inconsequential. Now 
what can be done within the R2P toolkit to resolve this situation?
The oppressive militarization of the CHT has been identified as the 
most important issue to be addressed here, by scholars and activists 
alike. The removal of military encampments was an important part 
of the 1997 Peace Accord that has yet to be implemented and this 
author argues that it is international intervention to have this part of 
the Accord upheld that would be the most effective application of R2P 
in the CHT. The Accord was an agreement between the government 
and the Indigenous peoples of the CHT that the government says it 
is still committed to,141 so the international community would not be 
forcing the implementation of an external agenda in Bangladesh. Still, 
it is important to question what form this intervention could best take. 
There is a movement among some Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh 
to push for an international mediator to step in to create dialogue 
between the various high-level actors involved in the Accord142 or 
simply to monitor the implementation of the Accord,143 which could 
fall within the R2P toolkit of diplomatic intervention. The Bangladesh 
141. “A/HRC/WG.6/16/BGD/1,” para. 109.
142. Drong, supra note 133.
143. Ibid.
146 Shayna Halliwell
Indigenous Peoples’ Forum has invited European ambassadors and 
United Nations representatives to meetings they hold in Dhaka to 
sensitize them to the situation, however the Forum has also faced 
push-back from the federal government for involving foreigners in 
what is perceived at the state level to be a domestic issue.144 External 
pressure through an international mediator could, for example, be 
used to establish a road map for implementation of the Peace Accord, 
as suggests Krishna Chakma, including the clause of the Accord that 
mandates de-militarization.145 
The final potential application of R2P would be military intervention 
by a foreign force or a United Nations peacekeeping operation. 
However, this option was rejected unanimously by all those consulted 
for this thesis who actually live in Bangladesh and it has not been 
suggested by any of the literature accessed for this research. The 
consensus among all sources consulted is that more violence is not the 
solution to decades of violence; rather, an inclusive political solution 
appears to be the best option as long as it acknowledges the legitimacy 
of the Indigenous peoples of the CHT and their rights to their culture 
and languages, lands, modes of governance and self-determination. 
IV.  Policy choices re: Protecting Indigenous peoples
a.  Is R2P an appropriate method of intervention to protect 
Indigenous Peoples?
In determining whether or not R2P is an appropriate model for 
intervention to protect Indigenous peoples from either state or third 
party violence, it is important to first question why Indigenous 
Peoples have been neglected from R2P interventions thus far. Using 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts to illustrate, I argue the reasons for the 
international community turning a blind eye to the many situations 
around the world in which Indigenous Peoples are the victims of 
violent conflict is a lack of strategic interest and political will; limited 
advocacy and international attention to pressure international actors 
144. Ibid.
145. Chakma, supra note 118.
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to step in; and a state-controlled narrative that minimizes the violence 
taking place. 
The United Nations Security Council has an extensive mandate 
and limited resources. As of right now, the situation in the CHT has 
not gained significant international media attention to force other 
governments to interfere in any meaningful way or to commit to get 
the implementation of the Peace Accord back on track. This inaction on 
behalf of the international community may in fact be entirely willful, 
since Bangladesh is one of the largest troop contributing countries to 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the world146 and pressure 
applied from other states could push them to withdraw their much-
needed soldiers. 
Tone Bleie, member of the International CHT Commission, argues 
that “Bangladesh isn’t important enough for the kind of international 
key actors which one could expect could propose in a persuasive 
way and have sufficient clout”147 to force an intervention of some 
kind. Bleie believes that “as long as there isn’t anything happening 
towards citizens from other countries on a grand scale,”148 the chances 
of international intervention are slim due to a sheer lack of political 
will. The CHT expert argues that only if this violence were affecting 
citizens from other nations—more than simply along Bangladesh’s 
borders with India and Myanmar—could there be a chance to seize 
international attention, since this would indicate that “the political 
system and development in Bangladesh is something which threatens 
security and development”149 internationally. 
Additionally, the international community may not want to be 
seen as promoting non-state actors in their resistance efforts, as the 
principle of R2P itself is premised on the primacy of the nation-state. 
When perceived as victims, those being terrorized fit more easily 
into the frame of civilian protection; but when they rebel against an 
146. “Troop and Police Contributors: Contributions by Country,” United Nations 
Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.
shtml.




oppressive nation-state, victims are quickly re-framed as perpetrators 
even if they have acted under the impression that violence is their only 
option for recourse. Indigenous Peoples in other parts of the world 
have also had to take up arms in order to retain even a small part 
of the independence, territory or self-determination they once had. 
Unfortunately, this makes justifying an R2P intervention in a situation 
such as this even more difficult, despite the fact that in many cases the 
choices were limited to engaging in the conflict or Indigenous Peoples 
losing their homes or lives. 
The issue of narrative framing is another reason why R2P has 
perhaps not been invoked where it has been needed in situations 
of mass atrocities committed against Indigenous Peoples. One of 
the main issues with the way many development programs have 
envisioned the situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is that the 
area is considered a “post-conflict zone.”150 When framed this way, 
the donors and agencies involved are released from addressing the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights that are still being 
violated in this region and can instead focus exclusively on economic 
development programming. For example, despite the fact that the 
Asian Development Bank report on their 2000–2009 CHT project 
was released in 2011—the same year that UN Special Rapporteur 
lars-Anders Baer released his damning report of the oppression of the 
Indigenous Peoples of the CHT at the hands of their government151—
the ADB only acknowledged a “20-year insurgency” in the CHT in the 
1980s and 1990s.152 The overwhelming evidence, however, indicates 
that the area is nowhere close to being beyond conflict as violence is 
actively ongoing.153 Even if there is mounting evidence that human 
rights violations are taking place here, the involved governments and 
150. “Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility,” UNDP in Bangladesh, http://www.
bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_
and_recovery/chittagong-hill-tracts-development-facility.html.
151. E/C.19/2011/6, "Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Accord of 1997 / Submitted by the Special Rapporteur.”
152. “Bangladesh Project Brief: Chittagong Hill Tracts Rural Development Project” 
(Asian Development Bank, South Asia Department, October 2011), 1.
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agencies may not want to acknowledge this: sometimes in instances 
of mass atrocities, United Nations “Member States and international 
agencies supporting countries under stress are not sufficiently open 
to messages that might challenge their view that these societies are 
moving in the right direction.”154 As Amartya Sen writes in Strategies 
of Economic Development, “when interests of groups differ and conflict 
with one another,”155 development programming will end up reflecting 
the aspirations of the more powerful of the two groups.156 In this case, 
the majority Bengali government is able to frame the development 
programming—and the discourse around the conflict in the CHT—to 
suit their agenda, to the detriment of the CHT’s Indigenous population.
Now that the potential reasons for the neglect of Indigenous-targeted 
conflicts has been laid out, the question still remains of whether R2P 
is an appropriate intervention mechanism for Indigenous Peoples or if 
there is a better alternative. Is there a way to apply R2P without further 
entrenching inequalities, some of which are rooted in colonialism?
Ultimately, for R2P to be applied in a situation in which Indigenous 
Peoples are the victims of mass atrocities, these Indigenous Peoples 
need to be acknowledged in the first place. If the state is the perpetrator 
of the crimes and does not acknowledge the Indigenous identities of 
those being victimized—perhaps to escape the obligation to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the rights that come with that identity—then under 
the R2P doctrine, it would fall to the international community to step 
in and ensure these crimes are prevented or stopped. In order for this 
principle to be applied to Indigenous Peoples specifically, it must also 
fall on the international community to acknowledge the Indigenous 
identity and the specific rights ascribed to this identity. The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights to self-determination and their rights to have 
their Indigenous identities respected. The establishment of UNDRIP 
was such an accomplishment in the realm of Indigenous rights 
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because it functions at the level of international law; the international 
community must, therefore, accept Indigenous Peoples’ assertions 
about their identities as Indigenous peoples. This has been put into 
practice by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
and its predecessor, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 
In instances of mass atrocities being committed against Indigenous 
Peoples, the international community could take the opportunity set 
by precedent to acknowledge the rights of Indigenous Peoples even 
if the state within whose territory the Indigenous Peoples reside 
does not acknowledge this same identity and set of rights. Perhaps 
this requirement on behalf of the international community could be 
incorporated into the R2P doctrine as the operationalization of the 
principle morphs over time.
As mentioned earlier, one of the major criticisms of R2P is that 
“R2P cannot be neatly disassociated from the prior modalities of 
colonial rule.”157 In “Colonialism and the Responsibility to Protect,” 
Mallavarapu argues that R2P “needs to be treated as part of an older 
and much wider global history of interventionism.”158 Only by 
attributing more agency to local populations will R2P overcome this 
inherent weakness of the principle. If the self-determination of “local 
‘non-state actors,’ civil society, social movements, indeed victims 
themselves”159 is better recognized by the international community 
and better incorporated into the R2P doctrine, atrocity crimes could 
not only be addressed more quickly but also perhaps prevented more 
widely. The only hope for international efforts to be mobilized more 
quickly is if there is accurate risk assessment and early warning, 
especially for minority-related conflict.160 Agency of non-state actors 
means not only the right to have a seat at the table when international 
intervention is being contemplated, but also means crediting all kinds 
of non-state actors with the “intelligence to figure out what might 
work best for their own political systems in crisis situations.”161 This 
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last component—engaging local people from all sides to provide 
an internal analysis of their specific cultural, economic, social and 
political context—is key because “Western intervention or doctrines 
like R2P cannot serve as a panacea to deeper structural problems 
which an unequal international order itself has in various ways 
perpetuated.”162 Tone Bleie makes the case that, in Bangladesh for 
example, the conflict in the CHT is actually symptomatic of a “core 
structural issue of a neo patrimonial state, where the military is one of 
the well functioning pillars.”163 What is happening in the CHT, states 
Bleie, is actually “pivoting around a deep-rooted relationship between 
most of the political and military elites.”164 Bleie argues that in order 
to understand the oppression and victimization of Indigenous Peoples 
of the CHT, one has to first recognize the role the neo patrimonial 
state plays in avoiding the implementation of the Peace Accord and, 
in particular, in refusing to “downsize the bloated army and put it to 
other kinds of civilian uses.”165
This context-specific understanding of the situation on the ground 
only occurs when many actors—especially non-state actors—are 
included in framing the history and wider background to the conflict. 
Part of resolving the situation in the CHT may include, beyond 
ending the violence and withdrawing the military, actually “nurturing 
a new less fractured, collective memory, which is much less racial 
and hierarchical in terms of ethnicity.”166 Unfortunately, the painful 
memory of atrocity crimes typically “contributes to the existence of 
deep distrust between communities as well as towards government 
institutions.”167 In Bangladesh, a resolution to the conflict would likely 
also include an appreciation for the ways in which the Indigenous 
Peoples of the CHT have attempted to protect themselves without 
labelling them terrorists or secessionists, in order for Bangladeshi 
society to move forward as a whole. An alternative understanding of 
162. Ibid.
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R2P in relation to Indigenous Peoples has the opportunity to take hold 
while the principle is still young, an understanding that is “rooted not 
in the international community’s ability to act but in the will of victims 
and civil society more generally to resist persecutions.”168 
IV.  Policy choices re: Protecting Indigenous Peoples
b. What does this mean for the future of R2P as a norm?
The aforementioned criticisms of R2P are not meant to imply 
that the concept of R2P should be tossed aside because its frame is 
outdated for the way the world is evolving. This principle has been 
transformed before and it can be transformed again. As long as the 
incoming Secretary-General retains a focus on R2P as Ban Ki-moon 
and Kofi Annan did, this emerging norm has a viable chance of 
re-building consensus on how to handle the toughest security, human 
rights and humanitarian situations and of institutionalizing a system-
wide approach to atrocity prevention within the United Nations. 
While Member States may continue to argue about R2P’s terms of 
engagement, there is a broad sense that a multi-lateral response to 
mass atrocities is not inappropriate in and of itself.169 As the former 
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Jennifer Welsh, has said, R2P sets expectations and provides 
a framework for action.170 However, as with every other international 
principle, it cannot compel action in and of itself.171 As Welsh stated, 
“We must not shy away from a principle because it is demanding”;172 
in fact, this should encourage the international community to invest in 
doing better. 
168. Mégret, supra note 56, at 581.
169. “Statement by Professor the Hon Gareth Evans at the UN General Assembly 
Thematic Panel Discussion, 26 February 2016: Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, February 26, 2016, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/415.
170. “Statement by Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on 





153THE RESPONSIBIlITY TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS PEOPlES?
The future of R2P must see the norm be invoked in consultation 
with all relevant stakeholders because “international responses to 
atrocity crimes tend to be most effective when the UN and regional 
and sub-regional arrangements work closely together.”173 In his 2016 
report entitled “Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of 
the Responsibility to Protect,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
emphasized the need to “encourage and support creative and bold 
innovations”174 by non-state actors in resolving atrocity crimes. The 
future of R2P is threatened, however, by the “erosion of the credibility 
of institutions such as the United Nations”175 based on the discrepancy 
between UN promises and actions in recent years. While the 2016 
Secretary-General R2P report “calls upon every member of the 
international community to speak out whenever and wherever atrocity 
crimes are being committed,”176 it is the responsibility of governments 
and the UN system to actually listen when those calls are being 
made—as they have been in Bangladesh for decades—and respond 
both appropriately and swiftly.
V.  Conclusion
The Responsibility to Protect is a norm with immense potential 
to prevent and help resolve situations of mass atrocities involving 
Indigenous peoples. However, the norm’s current iteration simply 
does not hold any space for the self-determination of those being 
victimized to make it a useful tool for Indigenous Peoples and the 
struggles in which they are engaged. If R2P were to undergo a paradigm 
shift—part of which would require the international community to 
acknowledge Indigenous identities and the rights associated therein, 
and to pay attention to conflicts that challenge the dominant state-
centric international order—then R2P could become a tool in the 
arsenal of Indigenous struggles the world over. 
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When looking specifically at the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 
Bangladesh, the first step towards resolving this entrenched conflict 
is for the government to acknowledge there are Indigenous Peoples 
within its borders. Not only does the government have the obligation 
to acknowledge the Indigenous identity of the “adibashi” of the CHT, 
but they must also create a timeline by which they will implement 
the clauses agreed upon in the 1997 Peace Accord. The international 
community needs to better supervise this implementation; it is 
not enough for the Bangladesh government to simply say they are 
committed to implementation while their military continue to act 
with impunity and third party observers act as silent witnesses to the 
ongoing violence.
More research needs to be conducted on the potential for the 
successful application of R2P among Indigenous Peoples, including 
further case studies. This author suggests focusing on the ways in 
which R2P and Indigenous self-determination could further reinforce 
rather than oppose one another. R2P has not been invoked in a situation 
of mass atrocities against Indigenous Peoples for many reasons, but 
primarily because R2P is not yet appropriately formed to address 
the struggles experienced specifically by Indigenous peoples. These 
include the inherent connection between loss of land, loss of culture, 
and loss of life. Ultimately, the Responsibility to Protect must be 
flexible and adaptable as it contends with changing geopolitical and 
geostrategic factors and the contextual nuances that make each R2P 
application different from the last.
